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INTRODUCTION 
Professor Harry Kalven Jr once called the public forum “the 
poor man’s printing press.”1 A significant feature of the modern 
regulatory apparatus governing access to the public forum, how-
ever, is that it often charges user fees to cover the costs of direct-
ing traffic, policing, and administering the public forum.2 And, as 
is the case any time the government puts a price on an activity, 
some people will be too poor to pay. This Comment asks whether 
the government must waive fees for indigent applicants for use of 
this “poor man’s printing press,” and if so, when and why. 
Public forum user fees should be a subject of significant con-
cern. The right to have access to a public forum is vital to a 
healthy marketplace of ideas and serves important democratic 
values. It allows speakers to convey their views to a wide audience 
and gives them access to specific people and institutions by en-
abling them to march on the streets, sidewalks, and statehouse 
steps near those to whom they would like to voice complaints. 
Furthermore, “the [open] public forum [ ] increases the likelihood 
that people generally will be exposed to a wide variety of people 
and views”—it is difficult to avoid seeing a parade or other 
demonstration in a public place.3 Even if indigent speakers are 
able to use other fora for free, fees still implicate distributional 
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 1 Harry Kalven Jr, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 S Ct 
Rev 1, 30. 
 2 For purposes of this Comment, the phrase “public forum” means “quintessential” 
public fora—public streets, parks, and sidewalks—plus public property that has been 
opened up by the government for expressive purposes. See Perry Education Association v 
Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 US 37, 45 (1983). 
 3 Cass Sunstein, republic.com 30–32 (Princeton 2001). 
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concerns because they ensure that wealthier speakers have their 
choice of forum while poor speakers do not. Choice of forum can 
be central to expression, so depriving poor speakers of choice 
means that they will have significantly fewer expressive possibil-
ities than wealthy speakers.4 
The circuit courts are currently split on the question whether 
an indigency waiver is required for public forum permitting fees. 
The majority of circuits have addressed the question under First 
Amendment doctrine and have held that the government is not 
required to waive fees for the indigent as long as there are ample 
alternative fora where the indigent can present their messages. 
The Eleventh Circuit, on the other hand, has held that lack of an 
indigency waiver renders a permitting fee facially invalid, relying 
partially on the Supreme Court’s 1974 decision in Lubin v Panish.5 
This Comment argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s result is 
correct, but arrives at that conclusion using the Equal Protection 
Clause rather than the First Amendment. The Supreme Court 
has held in a series of equal protection and due process cases that 
indigents cannot be prevented by fees from exercising certain fun-
damental rights. This Comment argues that these cases should 
govern the issue of public forum fee waivers. 
The Comment begins with a brief summary of the constitu-
tional law governing state regulation of the public forum. Part II 
examines how the circuits have analyzed the question of indigent 
fee waivers. Part III evaluates two major arguments against re-
quiring fee waivers and concludes that, while First Amendment 
doctrine does not provide sufficient clarity on the issue, it sug-
gests that at least some—and possibly all—fees are permissible 
without an indigency waiver. Part IV, however, argues that a 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection analysis is a better con-
ceptual fit and suggests a different result: an indigency waiver is 
required even in cases in which the speaker can use an alterna-
tive forum. 
I.  REGULATION OF THE PUBLIC FORUM 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no 
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the 
 
 4 See Part IV.C.3. 
 5 415 US 709 (1974). 
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right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances.”6 The First Amendment has 
been incorporated against the states, so state and local governments 
are equally forbidden to make laws abridging First Amendment 
freedoms.7 
The right to speak and assemble in public fora—“places 
which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted 
to assembly and debate”—has long been considered worthy of 
strong First Amendment protection.8 However, this right is not 
absolute, and public fora may be subject to some regulation con-
sistent with the First Amendment. 
A. Restrictions on the Rights of Speech and Assembly in the 
Public Forum: The Time, Place, and Manner Framework 
Over time, it has become clear that the First Amendment’s 
strong “Congress shall make no law” language must be taken with 
a healthy grain of salt. Governmental entities can and do pass 
valid laws restricting the reach of First Amendment freedoms. 
Courts, recognizing that absolutely untrammeled rights of free 
speech and assembly are unworkable, will allow these restrictions 
in certain circumstances.9 
In the context of the public forum, the Court seeks to strike a 
balance between the public’s historical right to use public streets 
and parks to speak and the concerns of public convenience. In 
Hague v Committee for Industrial Organization,10 a foundational 
case involving the use of the public forum, a plurality of the Court 
distinguished between permissible regulations designed to “pro-
mote [ ] public convenience in the use of the streets or parks” and 
ordinances that target “the right of assembly for the purpose of 
communicating views,” which are less likely to be permissible.11 
“[S]treets and parks,” the plurality held, “have immemorially 
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, 
 
 6 US Const Amend I. 
 7 See Gitlow v New York, 268 US 652, 666 (1925) (incorporating the freedom of 
speech); De Jonge v Oregon, 299 US 353, 364 (1937) (incorporating the freedom of assembly). 
 8 Perry Education Association v Perry Local Educators’ Association, 460 US 37, 45 
(1983) (noting that, in public fora, “the rights of the State to limit expressive activity are 
sharply circumscribed”). 
 9 See, for example, Schenck v United States, 249 US 47, 52 (1919) (“The most strin-
gent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre 
and causing a panic.”). 
 10 307 US 496 (1939). 
 11 Id at 515 (Roberts) (plurality). 
 2030  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:2027 
   
have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.” 12 
Hague made it clear that speakers have a First Amendment right 
to access traditional public fora—streets, parks, and sidewalks—
for the purposes of speech, communication, and assembly.13 
Despite the “ancient” nature of this right, Hague indicated 
that the use of public fora “must be exercised in subordination to 
the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with 
peace and good order.”14 The Court’s concern with “the general 
comfort and convenience” is easy to understand: if anyone at any 
time could claim an absolute right to parade on public streets, it 
would be enormously inconvenient to the public. There is even a 
justification for regulation rooted in promoting speech: speech in 
the public forum will be more easily heard and communicated 
without multiple speakers trying to use the same spaces at the 
same times.15 However, the plurality in Hague was careful to note 
that the right to use a public forum “must not, in the guise of reg-
ulation, be abridged or denied.”16 
The Court’s early balancing act in Hague foreshadowed the 
evolution of the modern framework for evaluating restrictions on 
the use of public fora. The Court has, roughly speaking, developed 
a two-tier approach. Regulations based on the content of speech 
must be necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and nar-
rowly tailored to that end.17 Content-neutral regulations relating 
to the time, place, and manner (TPM) of expression, meanwhile, 
 
 12 Id (Roberts) (plurality). 
 13 Professor Kalven describes this as “a kind of First-Amendment easement.” See 
Kalven, 1965 S Ct Rev at 13 (cited in note 1). 
 14 Hague, 307 US at 515–16 (Roberts) (plurality). 
 15 See, for example, Thomas v Chicago Park District, 227 F3d 921, 924 (7th Cir 2000) 
(“[T]o allow unregulated access to all comers could easily reduce rather than enlarge the 
park’s utility as a forum for speech.”). But note that the Court’s concern with maintaining 
public order may be overblown. See Tabatha Abu El-Haj, The Neglected Right of Assembly, 
56 UCLA L Rev 543, 561–62 (2009) (noting that “[u]ntil the late nineteenth century, there 
were no procedures that had to be undertaken to gain access to public spaces” and few 
restrictions on one’s ability to remain in public places). Courts, however, generally accept 
the necessity of regulating access to public fora as a given, and perhaps rightfully so given 
the significant technological changes since the nineteenth century. See, for example, 
Hague, 307 US at 515–16 (Roberts) (plurality) (“The privilege of a citizen of the United 
States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may 
be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative.”). 
 16 Hague, 307 US at 516 (Roberts) (plurality). 
 17 United States v Grace, 461 US 171, 177 (1983) (finding that “[a]dditional re-
strictions such as an absolute prohibition on a particular type of expression will be upheld 
only if narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling governmental interest”). 
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are subject to a less stringent standard.18 As long as the regulations 
“are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels 
of communication,” they pass constitutional muster.19 While this 
standard is lower than that for content-based regulations, it is far 
from an automatic pass. In United States v Grace,20 for example, 
the Court struck down a law banning the display of certain flags, 
banners, and devices on the public sidewalks surrounding the 
Supreme Court building because the flag ban did not substan-
tially serve the purpose of maintaining order and decorum within 
the Supreme Court grounds.21 
B. Fees on the Use of the Public Forum 
A significant question about the public forum involves the ex-
tent to which the government can impose fees for its use. Public 
forum permitting fees are usually imposed by local governments. 
Many such fees are designed to cover expenses incurred in admin-
istering the public forum and processing permit applications,22 as 
well as expenses incurred by the event itself.23 Fees can also take 
the form of indemnity agreements24 or liability insurance require-
ments.25 These fees can be quite large. The plaintiffs in Southern 
Oregon Barter Fair v Jackson County, Oregon,26 for example, were 
required to pay an $18,000 security deposit.27 In another case, 
demonstrators were charged $1,435.74 to cover the costs of police 
 
 18 While there was previously some doctrinal confusion over the level of scrutiny to 
be applied to TPM restrictions, it is now settled that TPM restrictions are not considered 
“prior restraint[s]” meriting strict scrutiny. Thomas v Chicago Park District, 534 US 316, 
321–23 (2002). 
 19 Grace, 461 US at 177, quoting Perry Education Association, 460 US at 45. 
 20 461 US 171 (1983). 
 21 Id at 181–82. 
 22 See, for example, Southern Oregon Barter Fair v Jackson County, Oregon, 372 F3d 
1128, 1132 (9th Cir 2004). 
 23 See, for example, Coalition for the Abolition of Marijuana Prohibition v City of 
Atlanta, 219 F3d 1301, 1320 (11th Cir 2000). 
 24 See, for example, The Nationalist Movement v City of York, 481 F3d 178, 181 (3d 
Cir 2007). 
 25 See, for example, Southern Oregon Barter Fair, 372 F3d at 1132. 
 26 372 F3d 1128 (9th Cir 2004). 
 27 Id at 1132. This included “over $3,600 for administrative expenses [ ] relat[ed] to 
the application, over $11,700 for the cost to the county sheriff [for] providing neighborhood 
security, and other [ ] expenses.” Id. 
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protection.28 While many ordinances cap fees, these caps can still 
leave would-be speakers open to significant costs.29 
The Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of 
public forum permitting fees in Cox v New Hampshire.30 In Cox, 
the Court reviewed the conviction of a group of Jehovah’s Witnesses 
for violating New Hampshire’s parade permitting statute.31 The 
permitting scheme at issue forbade parades or processions on 
public streets without a license. 32  Licensing fees ranged from 
nominal sums to as much as $300, depending on the size of the 
spectacle and the resulting cost of policing.33 The Supreme Court 
held, after little analysis, that licensing fees do not violate the 
First Amendment, as long as they are fixed in a “reasonable” way 
and administered in a “fair and non-discriminatory manner.”34 
The Court found it significant that the fee was “not a revenue 
tax,” but rather a charge directed to “meet[ing] the expense inci-
dent to the administration of the [permitting scheme] and to the 
maintenance of public order.”35 
The distinction between fees directed to defraying the costs 
of using a public forum and fees that serve as taxes or revenue 
measures appeared again in Murdock v Pennsylvania (City of 
Jeannette),36 decided two years after Cox. In Murdock, the Supreme 
Court struck down a local ordinance imposing flat fees on persons 
canvassing or soliciting within the borough.37 The license tax, the 
Court held, was constitutionally offensive because it made pay-
ment of a tax a condition on the exercise of First Amendment priv-
ileges: “Freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of reli-
gion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their 
own way.”38 While this sweeping language might have cast doubt 
on the validity of Cox, the Court was careful to distinguish the 
cases. The fees in cases like Cox are acceptable because they are 
 
 28 Central Florida Nuclear Freeze Campaign v Walsh, 774 F2d 1515, 1517–18 (11th 
Cir 1985). 
 29 See, for example, Southern Oregon Barter Fair, 372 F3d at 1132 (noting a $5,000 
cap); Forsyth County, Georgia v Nationalist Movement, 505 US 123, 126 (1992) (noting a 
$1,000 daily cap). 
 30 312 US 569 (1941). 
 31 Id at 570–71. 
 32 Id at 570–72. 
 33 Id at 576–77. 
 34 Cox, 312 US at 576–77. 
 35 Id at 577. 
 36 319 US 105 (1943). 
 37 Id at 106–07, 117. 
 38 Id at 111. 
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“nominal fee[s] imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the ex-
penses of policing the activities in question.”39 
Murdock inaugurated a long period of inactivity from the 
Supreme Court on the subject of public forum user fees. Over the 
next forty years, a circuit split developed on the permissibility of 
charging fees to speak in a public forum, with one circuit holding 
that greater-than-nominal fees were unconstitutional, 40  while 
others permitted greater-than-nominal fees so long as the fees 
were reasonably related to preserving the public safety and or-
der.41 In 1992, the Supreme Court stepped in to consider the con-
stitutionality of Forsyth County’s public demonstration permit-
ting scheme and to resolve the conflict among the courts of 
appeals.42 
The county ordinance at issue in Forsyth County, Georgia v 
Nationalist Movement43 required demonstrators to obtain permits 
for public demonstrations, declared that demonstrators must 
bear the costs of law enforcement, and required a fee of not more 
than $1,000.44 An administrator was charged with adjusting the 
fee to meet the expense of administering the ordinance and main-
taining public order at the demonstration.45 The Supreme Court 
held that the ordinance at issue was invalid for at least two rea-
sons: First, it gave the administrator too much discretion in setting 
 
 39 Id at 113–14, 116–17. This may have been a misreading or mischaracterization of 
Cox, in which the contested fees were not necessarily “nominal.” See Forsyth County, 505 
US at 139–40 (Rehnquist dissenting) (“The use of the word ‘nominal’ in Murdock was thus 
unfortunate, as it represented a mistaken characterization of the fee statute in Cox.”). See 
also note 42 (describing the disagreement among the circuit courts over the meaning of 
Murdock’s language). 
 40 See, for example, Nationalist Movement v City of Cumming, Forsyth County, Georgia, 
913 F2d 885, 891 (11th Cir 1990). 
 41 See, for example, Stonewall Union v City of Columbus, 931 F2d 1130, 1136 (6th 
Cir 1991). 
 42 See Forsyth County, 505 US at 129 & n 8. The circuit split pitted the Eleventh 
Circuit, which read Cox and Murdock to permit only nominal fees, against other circuits, 
which had held or stated in dicta that greater-than-nominal fees were permissible in order 
to defray administrative costs. Compare, for example, Central Florida, 774 F2d at 1522–
23 (“[W]e read Cox as authorizing only nominal charges for the use of city streets and 
parks to further First Amendment activities.”), with Eastern Connecticut Citizens Action 
Group v Powers, 723 F2d 1050, 1056 (2d Cir 1983) (“Licensing fees used to defray admin-
istrative expenses are permissible.”), and Stonewall Union, 931 F2d at 1136 (rejecting the 
notion that Murdock modified Cox so as to permit only nominal fees). 
 43 505 US 123 (1992). 
 44 Id at 126–27. 
 45 Id. 
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the fee, which could open the door to covert viewpoint discrimina-
tion.46 Second, the fee was often content-based in practice, be-
cause the administrator would sometimes assess the fee based on 
the likelihood of a hostile response to the message being con-
veyed,47 creating a heckler’s veto.48 Although Cox had permitted 
fees to be charged for “the maintenance of public order,” the Forsyth 
County Court refused to read Cox to allow the state to charge a 
premium for delivering a potentially controversial message.49 
While the Forsyth County opinion provided guidance on the 
questions of administrative discretion and police expenses, it 
failed to definitively resolve the question whether more-than-
nominal fees are ever permissible.50 The Court invalidated the fee 
on other grounds and held that the $1,000 cap could not save it 
from its other constitutional infirmities, but dodged the issue of 
more-than-nominal fees.51 One might think that the Court upheld 
the constitutionality of more-than-nominal fees by implication, 
because it did not strike down the fee as too large. However, given 
that this was the question that the Court granted certiorari to 
resolve, the omission seems deliberate. The Court could very eas-
ily have held that greater-than-nominal fees are not a constitu-
tional problem, but instead it carefully avoided doing so, drawing 
criticism from Chief Justice William Rehnquist for its failure to 
decide the question on which it granted certiorari.52 Thus, the con-
stitutional status of more-than-nominal user fees is somewhat 
uncertain, though lower courts seem to assume their constitution-
ality, relying on Cox.53 
In sum, restrictions on the use of a public forum are constitu-
tional when they are directed toward regulating the time, place, 
and manner of expression and are “content-neutral, [ ] narrowly 
 
 46 See id at 133. 
 47 See Forsyth County, 505 US at 133–34. 
 48 A heckler’s veto occurs when the government suppresses speech based on the hos-
tile response of the audience. The term was coined by Kalven, who noted that, “[i]f the 
police can silence the speaker [based on hostile audience reaction], the law in effect 
acknowledges a veto power in hecklers who can, by being hostile enough, get the law to 
silence any speaker of whom they do not approve.” Harry Kalven Jr, The Negro and the 
First Amendment 140 (Ohio State 1965). 
 49 Forsyth County, 505 US at 136, quoting Cox, 312 US at 577 (quotation marks omitted). 
 50 Forsyth County, 505 US at 137–38 (Rehnquist dissenting) (noting the Court’s non-
committal response to the question it granted certiorari to address). 
 51 Id at 136–37. 
 52 See id at 140 (Rehnquist dissenting). 
 53 See, for example, Fernandes v Limmer, 663 F2d 619, 633 (5th Cir 1981) (citing Cox 
as allowing “[a] licensing fee to . . . defray[ ] administrative costs”). 
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tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open 
ample alternative channels of communication.”54 Fees on expressive 
activity in a public forum are acceptable when they are directed 
toward defraying administrative costs and the costs of maintain-
ing public order.55 However, Cox did not provide a clear explana-
tion as to why it is permissible to shift the costs of administering 
speech in public spaces to users.56 Seemingly neutral regulatory 
schemes can run afoul of the content-neutrality requirement by 
allowing administrators too much discretion or by charging a pre-
mium for controversial speech. 57  This Comment asks whether 
content-neutral fees that are directed toward defraying adminis-
trative and public order costs and that are sufficiently limited in 
discretion—fees that, in other words, would meet the established 
requirements for constitutionality—must be waived for appli-
cants who cannot pay. 
II.  THE CIRCUITS WEIGH IN 
The question of indigent fee waivers for use of public fora has 
not yet come before the Supreme Court, but a number of federal 
appellate courts have encountered this issue, with mixed results. 
The Eleventh Circuit has held that lack of an indigency waiver 
was sufficient to render an ordinance facially unconstitutional. 
The First, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, however, have reasoned that 
an indigency waiver is not required provided that there are “am-
ple alternative” fora that the speaker can use without paying.58 
A.  Indigency Waiver Required 
The first federal appellate court to address this issue was the 
Eleventh Circuit. In Central Florida Nuclear Freeze Campaign v 
Walsh,59 the court heard a nonprofit antinuclear organization’s 
challenge to Orlando’s demonstration permitting ordinance.60 The 
 
 54 Perry Education Association, 460 US at 45. 
 55 See Cox, 312 US at 578. 
 56 It is not obvious that speakers should be made to bear the costs of using public 
spaces, especially when this approach treats speakers less favorably than people who use 
the same spaces for nonspeech purposes. For a discussion of the appropriateness of this 
approach, see generally David Goldberger, A Reconsideration of Cox v. New Hampshire: 
Can Demonstrators Be Required to Pay the Costs of Using America’s Public Forums?, 62 
Tex L Rev 403 (1983). 
 57 See Forsyth County, 505 US at 137. 
 58 Sullivan v City of Augusta, 511 F3d 16, 41–42 (1st Cir 2007). 
 59 774 F2d 1515 (11th Cir 1985). 
 60 Id at 1516–18. 
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organization was charged a $1,435.74 permit fee, which they 
eventually paid under protest.61 The Eleventh Circuit held that 
the lack of an indigency waiver rendered the ordinance facially 
unconstitutional, even though these particular demonstrators 
were likely able to pay.62 While there were other constitutional 
problems with the ordinance—among other things, the court read 
Cox and Murdock to prohibit all more-than-nominal permitting 
fees63—the court held that the inability of some persons to pay in 
advance was sufficient to render the statute unconstitutional.64 
The Eleventh Circuit’s analysis was unclear in many ways. 
While it held that the fee at issue was “unconstitutional” and indi-
cated that the ordinance as a whole violated the First Amendment,65 
it did not adequately explain why the inability of indigents to pay 
rendered the statute invalid. The court relied on Lubin, the Supreme 
Court’s 1974 ballot access decision, to support the idea that the 
lack of indigency waiver rendered the demonstration ordinance 
unconstitutional.66 In Lubin, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
California statute that required candidates to pay a fee to have 
their names placed on an election ballot without providing any 
alternative means to those unable to pay.67 With little explana-
tion, the Eleventh Circuit held that Lubin’s reasoning should ap-
ply to the right to access the streets for purposes of exercising 
First Amendment rights.68 The court also cited Murdock’s admon-
ition that “[f]reedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of reli-
gion are available to all, not merely to those who can pay their 
own way.”69 
Decades later, the Third Circuit agreed with the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s conclusion in dicta. Hearing a challenge from The Nationalist 
Movement (a white supremacist group) to a city’s permitting or-
dinance, the Third Circuit noted that because the ordinance was 
interpreted to provide a fee waiver to those who could not pay, it 
did not “unconstitutionally burden the free speech rights of those 
 
 61 Id at 1518. 
 62 Id at 1523–24. 
 63 Central Florida, 774 F2d at 1522. 
 64 Id at 1524. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Lubin, 415 US at 718. 
 68 Central Florida, 774 F2d at 1524. 
 69 Id, quoting Murdock, 319 US at 111. Reliance on Murdock was not essential to the 
court’s holding that the government must provide an indigency waiver—and rightly so, 
because Murdock involved a different kind of fee. 
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speakers too indigent to afford its payment.” 70 The court then 
cited Central Florida’s discussion of Lubin with approval.71 The 
discussion of fee waivers was unnecessary to reach a decision be-
cause the city interpreted its ordinance as including a fee 
waiver,72 but the court’s treatment of the issue implies that it 
would have found the ordinance to be unconstitutional had the 
city not provided a fee waiver to the indigent. 
Thus, one circuit has definitively held that an indigency 
waiver is required, and another seems inclined to agree. However, 
the constitutional basis for this requirement is not as clear as it 
could be. Reliance on Lubin seems to be the most important point, 
but the Eleventh Circuit did not explain why a holding about bal-
lot access should also apply in the arena of speech in a public fo-
rum.73 The intuitively appealing idea that speech and assembly 
rights should not be conditioned on ability to pay is powerfully 
expressed in Murdock’s language, but this rationale is not fully 
developed. Many important rights are conditioned on the ability 
to pay,74 and the Eleventh Circuit did not explain why the right 
to use a public forum should be different or why it is related to 
the right to unfettered ballot access. Thus, while two circuit 
courts have indicated that an indigency waiver is required, their 
reasoning is not completely persuasive. 
B. No Indigency Waiver Required, Provided There Are Ample 
Alternatives 
In contrast to the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, the majority 
of circuits that have addressed this question have held that an 
indigency waiver is not required, provided that there are ample 
alternative means for indigent speakers to express their messages. 
The Sixth Circuit took this view in Stonewall Union v City of 
Columbus.75 In Stonewall Union, the Sixth Circuit cited Cox in 
support of the proposition that licensing fees are permissible so 
long as they are “designed to meet the expenses incident to the 
administration of the law and the cost of maintaining public order 
 
 70 The Nationalist Movement v City of York, 481 F3d 178, 184 (3d Cir 2007). 
 71 Id, citing Central Florida, 774 F2d at 1523–24. 
 72 The city conceded this point at oral argument, despite seemingly contrary lan-
guage in the waiver provision itself. Nationalist Movement, 481 F3d at 184. 
 73 See Central Florida, 774 F2d at 1524. 
 74 The government, for example, does not hand out free guns so that all citizens may 
exercise their Second Amendment right to bear arms regardless of ability to pay. 
 75 931 F2d 1130 (6th Cir 1991). 
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for the parade.”76 The court then rejected the contention that the 
lack of an indigency waiver rendered the ordinance unconstitu-
tional.77 Distinguishing Central Florida and Lubin, the court rea-
soned that this case was crucially different because “failure to sat-
isfy the fee prerequisite” did not totally “preclude[ ] . . . 
involvement in the constitutionally protected activity.”78 In this 
case, because there were alternative fora the speakers could use 
for free—for example, the city’s sidewalks and parks—the lack of 
an indigency waiver was not a constitutional problem.79 
This line of argument was picked up and expanded by other 
circuit courts. In Sullivan v City of Augusta,80 the First Circuit 
reiterated and expanded on the Sixth Circuit’s alternative forum 
reasoning by reversing the district court’s holding that lack of an 
indigency waiver rendered the statute unconstitutional. 81  The 
court reasoned at length that sidewalks and parks constitute ac-
ceptable alternatives to streets, despite testimony from the plain-
tiffs’ expert witness (a sociologist), who testified to street demonstra-
tions’ greater ability to attract attention, the historical and 
symbolic significance of street marches, and the logistical chal-
lenges of sidewalk marches.82 As the First Circuit noted, however, 
First Amendment precedent establishes that the government is 
not required to guarantee to every speaker her preferred means 
of communication at all times and in all places.83 The court held 
that as long as there remain “avenues for the general dissemina-
tion of a message,” the restriction is acceptable.84 Because the 
sidewalks and parks provided ample opportunity for speakers to 
convey their message, the government was not required to do 
more.85 The court also expressed concern that requiring an indi-
gency waiver would effectively require the government to subsi-
dize indigent speech.86 When “there are ample alternative forums 
 
 76 Id at 1133. 
 77 Id at 1137. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Stonewall Union, 931 F2d at 1137. 
 80 511 F3d 16 (1st Cir 2007). 
 81 Id at 41–42. 
 82 Id at 42–44. 
 83 Id at 44, citing Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v Taxpayers 
for Vincent, 466 US 789, 812 (1984). 
 84 Sullivan, 511 F3d at 44, quoting Frisby v Schultz, 487 US 474, 483–84 (1988) (quo-
tation marks omitted). 
 85 Sullivan, 511 F3d at 43–44. 
 86 Id at 41–42. 
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for speech,” there is “insufficient justification” for “forcing general 
taxpayers to support financially a particular organizer’s event.”87 
The Sullivan decision prompted a lengthy dissent from Judge 
Kermit Lipez, who drew on the Supreme Court’s equal protection 
and due process jurisprudence to articulate an argument for the 
necessity of an indigency waiver. Lipez pointed out that, when 
fundamental rights are at stake, the Supreme Court has often 
held—using due process or equal protection principles or both—
that a public subsidy is necessary for the indigent.88 Given the 
fundamental nature of the right at stake, he reasoned that the 
fees should be subject to heightened review.89 Lipez then applied 
the traditional three-pronged TPM test, and concluded that, un-
der the heightened scrutiny he proposed, the fees failed to leave 
open ample alternative channels for communication of the infor-
mation.90 Sidewalks and parks, he argued, are simply not the 
same as the streets. 91  “[U]nder any meaningful standard of 
heightened review, that alternative forum cannot be ample if it 
lacks the qualities that make the streets a uniquely powerful fo-
rum for expression, and thereby leaves indigent speakers and the 
public they seek to influence with a substantially different and 
diminished First Amendment experience.”92 Lipez thus provided 
the most in-depth advocacy for the constitutional requirement of 
an indigency waiver to date, and expanded on the equal protection 
argument hinted at by the Eleventh Circuit’s reference to Lubin. 
However, he applied the traditional TPM framework to analyze 
the issue, and consequently made an argument that might be ap-
plicable only as applied to access to the streets. 
The most recent appellate case on point is the Tenth Circuit’s 
opinion in iMatter Utah v Njord.93 The Tenth Circuit noted the 
circuit split on the issue, and more or less restated the First Circuit 
majority’s justification in rejecting the plaintiffs’ as-applied chal-
lenge.94 Quoting Sullivan, the court noted that “[t]here is a vast 
number of areas in which a lack of funds may disadvantage an 
 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id at 46–47 (Lipez dissenting). 
 89 Sullivan, 511 F3d at 48–49 (Lipez dissenting). 
 90 Id at 55 (Lipez dissenting). 
 91 Id at 49–55 (Lipez dissenting). 
 92 Id at 55 (Lipez dissenting). 
 93 774 F3d 1258 (10th Cir 2014). 
 94 See id at 1264. 
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individual, and a constitutional determination that in civil mat-
ters an indigent need not pay costs ordinarily imposed on others 
is a matter to be approached with some caution.”95 
In sum, the majority position among the circuits is that there 
is no need for the government to waive fees for the indigent as 
long as there are adequate alternatives to the desired fora. Side-
walks and parks, in the view of these courts, are adequate alter-
natives to street protests. These courts worried about imposing 
an obligation on the government to subsidize indigent applicants, 
and correctly noted that the First Amendment does not require 
speakers to be given their choice of forum in every circumstance. 
Interestingly, even the circuits that have found that no fee waiver 
is required have not attempted to argue that a fee that totally 
deprived indigents of their access to the public forum would be 
constitutional. This absence might suggest that there are limits 
on the state’s ability to restrict indigent access to the public fo-
rum, but so far courts have not thoroughly addressed the extent 
of these limits. 
III.  INDIGENCY WAIVER AS A FIRST AMENDMENT QUESTION 
There are two basic arguments against requiring a fee 
waiver, both with strong roots in First Amendment doctrine. 
First, there is an argument about subsidies. It is well established 
that the government is not required to subsidize private speech.96 
If permitting fees simply pass along the costs inherent in the use 
of the public forum, there is no reason to require the state to pay 
those costs for indigent speakers.97 Second, it is also well estab-
lished that the government does not need to guarantee speakers 
their choice of platform.98 As long as indigent speakers can gener-
ally get their messages out through use of public fora, the argu-
ment runs, the restriction is acceptable under the three-pronged 
test for content-neutral restrictions. 
 
 95 Id at 1265, quoting Sullivan, 511 F3d at 45 (brackets in original). 
 96 See, for example, Rust v Sullivan, 500 US 173, 193 (1991), quoting Regan v Taxa-
tion with Representation of Washington, 461 US 540, 549 (1983) (finding, in the context of 
a First Amendment challenge, that “[a] legislature’s decision not to subsidize the exercise 
of a fundamental right does not infringe the right”). 
 97 See, for example, Cox, 312 US at 577 (asserting that fees designed to cover event 
expenses are not per se unconstitutional). 
 98 See Heffron v International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc, 452 US 640, 
647 (1981) (“[T]he First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s 
views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired.”). 
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Both of these arguments have appeal, and both have been 
employed to support major decisions in this area. The argument 
about choice of platform comes up more than the argument about 
subsidies, though the subsidies argument actually would be 
stronger if it is correct, because it implies that fees should be per-
missible in all circumstances. If the indigency waiver is a subsidy, 
and there is no requirement that the government subsidize 
speech, there is no reason to require ample alternatives. The 
choice-of-platform argument is somewhat more palatable, how-
ever, because it allows courts to avoid saying that one may simply 
be too poor to exercise certain First Amendment rights. 
A. Subsidized Speech? 
The motivating principle behind the courts’ willingness to al-
low the kinds of fees contemplated in Cox seems to be that those 
fees are not “taxes” on the use of the public forum but are rather 
the inherent costs of using the forum.99 In the same way that an 
organization would need to pay for a band to play at its event or 
the costs of decorating a float, it must also pay the costs incurred 
by the government in controlling traffic, processing applications, 
and perhaps also providing police protection. Accordingly, courts 
have held that the government cannot charge more than the costs 
incurred in administering and carrying out the event.100 While the 
government cannot profit from these fees, if the fees are compa-
rable to other expenses inherent in the use of the public forum, it 
is unlikely that the First Amendment would require the govern-
ment to subsidize indigent speakers by waiving their fees. 
Indigents might point to Forsyth County to demonstrate that 
the government is already required to cover some expenses for 
controversial speakers, despite the general principle that the gov-
ernment need not pay for the costs of speech. In Forsyth County, 
the Supreme Court held that Cox did not permit the state to 
charge unpopular speakers for the extra costs of police protec-
tion. 101  This holding, however, effectively requires the govern-
ment to subsidize controversial messages, but not uncontroversial 
 
 99 See, for example, Sullivan, 511 F3d at 41–42; Goldberger, 62 Tex L Rev at 412 
(cited in note 56) (noting the Cox Court’s “assumption that the relationship between a 
speaker and the government can be treated like a two-party business relationship”). 
 100 See Eastern Connecticut Citizens Action Group v Powers, 723 F2d 1050, 1056 (2d 
Cir 1983); Fernandes v Limmer, 663 F2d 619, 633 (5th Cir 1981); Baldwin v Redwood City, 
540 F2d 1360, 1372 (9th Cir 1976); Sullivan, 511 F3d at 38. 
 101 Forsyth County, 505 US at 136. 
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ones. Therefore, Forsyth County’s holding on controversial speech 
might indicate that the government is required to subsidize at 
least some of the costs of using the public forum for some speak-
ers. However, controversial speakers are likely distinguishable 
from indigent speakers. Courts have historically worried more 
about content discrimination than income discrimination, so it 
would be difficult to persuade a court that Forsyth County man-
dates government assistance for indigent speakers in the same 
way it mandates assistance for controversial speakers. 
Indigent speakers might also argue that Cox’s requirement 
that fees be reasonable inherently requires some level of subsidy. 
Perhaps there is some level at which fees would be unreasonable 
even if they reflected only the actual costs of the speech to the 
government. To the extent that costs are unreasonable, therefore, 
Cox would appear to require subsidizing those costs for all speak-
ers. Indigents might therefore argue that the generally applicable 
fees are unreasonable as applied to them. This argument is also 
likely to fail, however. It would require courts to inquire into the 
particulars of what it is reasonable to expect each speaker to pay, 
introducing an element of subjectivity into an apparently objec-
tive test. Courts are unlikely to want to wade into a morass of 
factual issues about how much it is subjectively reasonable to ex-
pect any given speaker to pay, a messy endeavor that might entail 
jury fact-finding. In the past, the Court has often been reluctant 
to get into ad hoc case-by-case judgments when it comes to speech 
rights,102 so there is reason to think it would not like to do so here. 
Furthermore, reasonableness standards are usually applied in an 
objective way such that indigents or other unusually positioned 
actors cannot challenge them.103 
In conclusion, the general principle against government 
speech subsidies provides a strong argument that, from a First 
Amendment perspective, no indigency waiver is required for pub-
lic forum user fees, regardless of the availability of alternative 
 
 102 See, for example, Brown v Entertainment Merchants Association, 131 S Ct 2729, 
2743–35 (2011) (rejecting emphatically a proposed balancing standard for categories of 
unprotected speech); United States v O’Brien, 391 US 367, 383–85 (1968) (expressing re-
luctance to inquire into the legislative intent behind facially neutral laws affecting 
speech). 
 103 See, for example, Crawford v Marion County Election Board, 553 US 181, 205–06 
(2008) (Scalia concurring in the judgment) (stating that in the voting context the Court 
considers the impact of voting regulations “on voters generally” rather than on individual 
voters). 
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fora. Ultimately, however, no circuit court has taken the subsidies 
point to its logical conclusion. 
B. Ample Alternatives? 
The more popular reasoning among the circuits is that the 
government is not required to guarantee any speaker her ideal 
means of speech so long as there are ample alternative fora for 
speech. This idea has appeal—it is clearly not true that the gov-
ernment has to allow speakers their ideal forum or channel of 
communication in all circumstances.104 This is the central idea be-
hind a TPM restriction. But the ample alternatives test does not 
fit well with the indigency waiver question because, unlike most 
other limitations on one’s ability to use certain channels of com-
munication, permitting fees restrict speech based on characteris-
tics of the speaker rather than the manner of the speech. 
The First Circuit supported its ample alternatives formula-
tion with references to two illustrative Supreme Court cases.105 In 
one of these cases, Members of the City Council of the City of Los 
Angeles v Taxpayers for Vincent,106 the Court upheld an ordinance 
forbidding the posting of all signs on public property (with a nar-
row exception for officially approved commemorative plaques).107 
Fees were not at issue in the case.108 Even though “[t]he ordinance 
prohibit[ed] appellees from communicating . . . in a [particular] 
manner[ ] and presumably diminishe[d] the [ ] quantity of their 
communication,” the ordinance did not violate the First Amendment 
because there were ample alternative modes of communication 
through which the speakers could demonstrate their support of 
Roland Vincent’s candidacy. 109  Over appellees’ objections, the 
Court held that “the posting of political posters on public property” 
 
 104 See Part II.B. 
 105 See Sullivan, 511 F3d at 44. 
 106 466 US 789 (1984). 
 107 Id at 791 n 1, 817. 
 108 See id at 793–96 (describing the procedural history of the case). 
 109 Id at 803, 812. 
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was not “a uniquely valuable or important mode of communica-
tion.”110 Similarly, in Frisby v Schultz,111 the Court upheld a local 
ordinance forbidding picketing on the public streets around pri-
vate residences in order to prevent “emotional disturbance and 
distress to the occupants.”112 The Court reasoned that the ordi-
nance was constitutional because it was content neutral, justified 
by the interest of protecting unwilling listeners in the sanctity of 
the home, and still permitted the “general dissemination of a mes-
sage.”113 Protestors, the Court noted, were still free to march down 
the streets, go door-to-door, distribute literature, and even con-
tact residents by phone.114 Other cases have similarly upheld bans 
on certain kinds of expressive conduct, including information dis-
tribution through noisy sound trucks,115 political advertising on 
city buses,116 and certain kinds of outdoor billboards.117 
In light of this precedent, the majority conclusion that there 
is no requirement of an indigency waiver as long as there are 
available alternatives makes some sense. In many ways, the fees 
in Sullivan looked a lot like the picketing ordinance in Frisby: 
they were content neutral, were designed to meet a recognized 
government interest (administrative cost defrayal), and permit-
ted those who could not pay other opportunities to convey their 
message. On the other hand, public forum fees differ from the 
picketing restriction at issue in Frisby, the signposting restriction 
at issue in Taxpayers for Vincent, and most other permitted re-
strictions on First Amendment expression in an important way. 
These cases, cited by the First Circuit, involved restrictions on the 
kind of speech activity permitted, whereas the fees at issue in 
these cases in effect restrict speech based on the characteristics 
 
 110 Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 US at 812. There is an argument to be made that 
streets are a “uniquely valuable” mode of communication. Judge Lipez argued this point 
at length in his dissent in Sullivan. Sullivan, 511 F3d at 55 (Lipez dissenting). But in the 
end, while an acknowledgement that the argument that streets are unique is likely to be 
helpful for specific plaintiffs, it does not answer the underlying question of the permissi-
bility of prohibitive charges on the use of the public forum. If the state wanted to impose 
fees for the use of sidewalks or parks, or all public fora, an acknowledgement that streets 
are uniquely valuable would be totally unhelpful. 
 111 487 US 474 (1988). 
 112 Id at 477, 488. The ordinance was prompted by concerns related to incidents of 
peaceful picketing of the home of an abortion provider. Id at 476–77. 
 113 Id at 483–85. 
 114 Id at 483–84. 
 115 See Kovacs v Cooper, 336 US 77, 87 (1949). 
 116 See Lehman v City of Shaker Heights, 418 US 298, 302–03 (1974) (Blackmun) 
(plurality). 
 117 See Metromedia, Inc v City of San Diego, 453 US 490, 512 (1981) (White) (plurality). 
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of the speaker. The laws in Frisby and Taxpayers for Vincent re-
stricted where, when, and how people could speak, not who could 
speak. The First Amendment test for content-neutral regulation 
in the public forum is primarily designed to serve practical ends, 
allowing the government to coordinate among different speakers 
and balance the practical considerations of traffic, noise, and per-
sonal privacy. While permitting fees arise out of practical budget-
ary considerations, they do not raise the kinds of considerations 
about coordination that motivate the test for TPM restrictions. 
The case of public forum user fees is therefore different in a 
way that should shape this analysis. What is difficult and trou-
bling about these fees is that they allocate and restrict First 
Amendment rights based on the speaker’s ability to pay. Solvent 
speakers get to access the forum of their choice, indigent speakers 
do not, and this distinction is caused by government action (the 
imposition of a fee). It is a government action that creates a cate-
gorization that grants some people more access than others. In 
other words, it looks like a classic equal protection problem. 
IV.  INDIGENCY WAIVERS AS AN EQUAL PROTECTION QUESTION 
Courts have been trying to apply First Amendment frame-
works to something that is better conceptualized as an equal pro-
tection question, with confusing results. The most common argu-
ment against requiring an indigency waiver relies on First 
Amendment case law, which allows restrictions on the kinds of 
ways people can speak and assemble, but it is not clear that that 
case law should apply to restrictions that affect who can speak. 
This is an issue that is better addressed by the Equal Protection 
Clause, which deals with laws that treat some people differently 
than other people. The other First Amendment concern, the prop-
osition that the government does not have to subsidize speech, is 
also more clearly answered through an equal protection lens. 
Equal protection law has extensively addressed the question of 
when the government needs to subsidize the exercise of funda-
mental rights. Looking at this issue as a Fourteenth Amendment 
question therefore provides more clarity than working with First 
Amendment doctrines and suggests that fees must be waived 
even when there are alternative fora. 
This Part first examines the relationship between equal pro-
tection jurisprudence and First Amendment jurisprudence. Next, 
it surveys cases in which the Court has dealt with fees denying 
indigents the exercise of fundamental rights and interests. In 
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these cases the Court has held that under the Fourteenth 
Amendment certain fees are invalid as applied to indigents. Thus, 
this Part argues that the same reasoning should apply to the case 
of public forum fees. Finally, this Part analyzes and rejects the 
distinctions offered by the majority of circuits between these cases 
and the public forum permitting cases. 
A. Equal Protection and the First Amendment 
The interactions between the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments are complex and not fully developed. It is well settled that 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
hibits certain content-based restrictions of speech.118 In other con-
texts, scholars and judges have suggested interplay between the 
two amendments,119 especially in areas that strongly implicate 
both expressive and equality values—for example, election law120 
and hate speech. 121  However, the relationship between the 
amendments is not completely clear.122 
 
 118 See R.A.V. v City of St. Paul, Minnesota, 505 US 377, 406 (1992) (White concurring 
in the judgment) (“[T]he Equal Protection Clause requires that the regulation of unpro-
tected speech be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.”); Carey v Brown, 
447 US 455, 461–62 (1980) (“When government regulation discriminates among speech-
related activities in a public forum, the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the legis-
lation be finely tailored to serve substantial state interests, and the justifications offered 
for any distinctions it draws must be carefully scrutinized.”); Police Department of the City 
of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92, 94–96 (1972) (“Because Chicago treats some picketing 
differently from others, we analyze this ordinance in terms of the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
 119 Compare Vieth v Jubelirer, 541 US 267, 294 (2004) (Scalia) (plurality), with id at 
314–17 (Kennedy concurring in the judgment), with id at 324–25 (Stevens dissenting) (re-
vealing a disagreement among the justices about what role the First Amendment should 
play in racial gerrymandering cases). See also generally Daniel P. Tokaji, First Amend-
ment Equal Protection: On Discretion, Inequality, and Participation, 101 Mich L Rev 2409 
(2003); Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43 U 
Chi L Rev 20 (1975). 
 120 See, for example, Williams v Rhodes, 393 US 23, 31, 34 (1968) (noting that a state law 
that made it difficult for a third party to appear on ballots implicated First and Fourteenth 
Amendment concerns). 
 121 See, for example, Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. 
v. City of St. Paul, 106 Harv L Rev 124, 126 (1992) (asking whether hate speech may be 
prohibited under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments rather than the First 
Amendment); Cass R. Sunstein, Words, Conduct, Caste, 60 U Chi L Rev 795, 802 (1993) 
(“[T]he government might be permitted to justify certain narrow restrictions on speech by 
reference to the Civil War Amendments, by claiming that the interest in equality is suffi-
ciently neutral and weighty to support those restrictions.”). 
 122 Compare, for example, Williams–Yulee v Florida Bar, 135 S Ct 1656, 1668–70 
(2015) (analyzing campaign finance restrictions under the First Amendment), with Buckley 
v Valeo, 424 US 1, 30–31 (1976) (analyzing campaign finance restrictions under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments). 
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In many cases, it is uncertain how the Equal Protection 
Clause does or should interact with the First Amendment, and 
vice versa. In Police Department of the City of Chicago v Mosley,123 
for example, the Court struck down a Chicago picketing ordinance 
on the basis that it violated the Equal Protection Clause.124 The 
use of the Equal Protection Clause to strike down the ordinance 
in Mosley was surprising because it was unnecessary—the Court 
could have easily reached the same result on First Amendment 
grounds.125 Because the First Amendment has its own equality 
principle, at least when it comes to discrimination based on view-
point or content,126 it is not always clear what the Fourteenth 
Amendment adds to the equation. In fact, the use of equal protec-
tion in Mosley and similar cases has been criticized for being too 
speech insensitive and open to the possibility of equalizing by re-
ducing speech opportunities across the board.127 
Because of the fact that the First Amendment contains its 
own guarantee of equality in that it prevents the government 
from favoring certain ideas over others, equal protection claims 
are often beside the point when it comes to speech rights litiga-
tion.128 Generally speaking, the government needs a good justifi-
cation for any speech restriction, and most laws that are uncon-
stitutionally discriminatory in the equal protection sense will fail 
to meet that standard. A law prohibiting African Americans from 
speaking in a public forum, for example, obviously violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but also violates the First Amendment 
because racial animus is not a good enough reason to restrict 
speech rights. In most cases, the First Amendment will actually 
do a better job of protecting group speech rights than the Fourteenth 
 
 123 408 US 92 (1972). 
 124 Id at 95, 102. 
 125 See id at 96 (“[U]nder the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention the First Amendment 
itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds accepta-
ble, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 126 See Williams–Yulee, 135 S Ct at 1680 (“[T]he First Amendment is a kind of Equal 
Protection Clause for ideas.”); Karst, 43 U Chi L Rev at 21 (cited in note 119). 
 127 See generally Roy A. Black, Case Comment, Equal but Inadequate Protection: A 
Look at Mosley and Grayned, 8 Harv CR–CL L Rev 469 (1973). The concern with “equal-
izing down” is not a serious concern here, however. The Fourteenth Amendment analysis 
in this Comment suggests only that, assuming there is some basic right to access a public 
forum (which there is under Hague), indigents must be given more expressive opportuni-
ties, not that everyone could be given fewer. 
 128 See, for example, First National Bank of Boston v Bellotti, 435 US 765, 774 n 8 
(1978) (declining to reach appellants’ equal protection claims because appellants suc-
ceeded on their First Amendment arguments). 
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Amendment, because protecting speech simply is not the purpose 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the absence of the First Amend-
ment, for example, the Fourteenth Amendment would likely per-
mit speech restrictions based on the speaker’s identity if they 
could be justified by a rational relationship to a legitimate state 
interest, so long as the restriction did not target a protected 
class.129 
The case of indigent speakers in the public forum provides an 
interesting contrast because it is a place where the Fourteenth 
Amendment might provide more protection for speech rights than 
the First Amendment. Unlike content- or viewpoint-based dis-
crimination, which are likely to also be unconstitutional under 
the First Amendment, indigency fees are likely not unconstitu-
tional under the First Amendment if they leave open ample alter-
native fora.130 However, as this Comment argues, they may be un-
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. Unlike in 
Mosley, an equal protection analysis adds to the discussion here 
because it might guarantee a speech right that the First Amend-
ment does not. While this might seem odd at first glance, it makes 
sense upon closer examination. The focus of Equal Protection 
Clause jurisprudence is differential treatment of groups of people, 
so it should be expected that the Equal Protection Clause will 
sometimes add to the protections of the Bill of Rights when gov-
ernment actions create inequality with respect to those rights.131 
B. Indigency Waiver with No Ample Alternatives 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to hold that poor 
people are a suspect class.132 On the other hand, there is a long 
tradition of invalidating wealth classifications when they inter-
fere with access to at least some fundamental rights, especially 
 
 129 See R.A.V., 505 US at 406–07 (White concurring in the judgment). 
 130 See Part III.B. 
 131 For a similar example, consider the use of racial profiling in police searches. While 
the Fourth Amendment will provide some protection against discrimination by requiring 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify a search or seizure, it has little to say 
about inequitable police administration once the threshold standard of reasonable suspi-
cion or probable cause is met. The Equal Protection Clause, however, imposes additional 
limitations on how searches may be carried out. See, for example, Whren v United States, 
517 US 806, 813 (1996) (noting that the constitutional basis for objecting to discriminatory 
police searches is the Equal Protection Clause rather than the Fourth Amendment); People 
v Kail, 501 NE2d 979, 981–82 (Ill App 1986) (upholding an equal protection challenge even 
when the police had probable cause to arrest under the Fourth Amendment). 
 132 See, for example, San Antonio Independent School District v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 
28 (1973). 
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when a government monopoly is involved.133 The Court has mostly 
used the Equal Protection Clause to strike down these kinds of 
wealth classifications. But it has also relied on the Due Process 
Clause, and sometimes has relied on both when the cases involved 
the intersection of equal protection and due process concerns.134 
While the analysis in this area does not fit neatly into typical 
equal protection (or due process) doctrine,135 there is a clear pat-
tern of requiring the government to waive fees for indigents when 
certain fundamental rights are implicated. This Section discusses 
cases holding that the government must waive fees for indigents, 
focusing particularly on electoral process cases to establish their 
similarity to the right to access the public forum. While these de-
cisions do not fit into traditional equal protection categories of 
scrutiny, it is clear that fees depriving indigent people of access 
to fundamental rights are closely scrutinized.136 This Section ar-
gues that public forum fees should be held to similarly exacting 
scrutiny when they deprive indigents of access to a public forum. 
 
 133 See, for example, M.L.B. v S.L.J., 519 US 102, 124 (1996) (finding that access to 
“judicial processes in cases criminal or ‘quasi criminal in nature’” and those that “forever 
terminat[e] parental rights” cannot be limited to those who can pay a fee); Lubin, 415 US 
at 718 (“[I]n the absence of reasonable alternative means of ballot access, a State may not, 
consistent with constitutional standards, require from an indigent candidate filing fees he 
cannot pay.”); Bullock v Carter, 405 US 134, 149 (1972) (invalidating a Texas law that 
“requir[ed] candidates to shoulder the costs of conducting primary elections . . . and [ ] 
provid[ed] no reasonable alternative means of access to the ballot” because it “erected a 
system that utilize[d] the criterion of ability to pay as a condition to being on the ballot”); 
Harper v Virginia Board of Elections, 383 US 663, 666 (1966) (“We conclude that a State 
violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever it makes 
the affluence of the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.”); Griffin v Illinois, 
351 US 12, 17 (1956) (Black) (plurality) (“In criminal trials a State can no more discrimi-
nate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or color.”). 
 134 Because many cases involve the intersection of equal protection and due process 
concerns, there is some terminological and doctrinal confusion when referring to this set 
of cases. This Comment uses the term “equal protection” because most cases in this area 
rest on an equal protection framework. See M.L.B., 519 US at 120 (noting that while cases 
concerning access to judicial process “reflect both equal protection and due process con-
cerns,” “[m]ost decisions in this area . . . res[t] on an equal protection framework”) (brack-
ets in original). Furthermore, unlike in cases involving access to the judicial process, ac-
cess to the public forum does not implicate due process concerns in a significant way, so 
“equal protection” is a more conceptually appropriate term for this issue. 
 135 See id (“A precise rationale [for cases involving indigent access to judicial pro-
cesses] has not been composed because cases of this order cannot be resolved by resort to 
easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
 136 See note 134. The standard imposed in these cases looks a lot like strict scrutiny. 
See, for example, Bullock, 405 US at 144 (noting that “laws [related to voter financial 
resources] must be ‘closely scrutinized’ and found reasonably necessary to the accomplish-
ment of legitimate state objectives”). In some places, the Court characterizes this standard 
as strict scrutiny. See, for example, Rodriguez, 411 US at 29. In other cases, however, the 
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1. Electoral rights analogy. 
Perhaps the closest analogy to public forum fee waivers is a 
string of cases involving ballot access and the right to political 
participation. The Eleventh Circuit gestured to this group of cases 
by citing Lubin.137 Lubin, however, was preceded by two other 
cases that are worth discussing. In Harper v Virginia Board of 
Elections,138 the Supreme Court considered a challenge to Virginia’s 
poll tax, which required each resident twenty-one years or older 
to pay a fee of not more than $1.50 to the state on penalty of dis-
enfranchisement.139 The Court concluded that the Equal Protection 
Clause was violated “whenever [the state] makes the affluence of 
the voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.”140 Com-
menting that wealth classifications, like race, are “traditionally 
disfavored,” the Court warned that “where fundamental rights 
and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause, 
classifications which might invade or restrain them must be 
closely scrutinized and carefully confined.”141 
The Burger Court expanded the Warren Court’s view in Harper 
by continuing to invalidate wealth conditions on political partici-
pation well into the 1970s. In Bullock v Carter,142 for example, the 
Court invalidated Texas’s very high filing fees to appear on the 
primary ballot.143 The Court applied “close scrutiny” because the 
fee requirement tended to limit voter choice and the rights of pro-
spective candidates based on economic status; thus, the Court 
held that the fees violated the Equal Protection Clause.144 Texas’s 
proffered interests were insufficient to save the law.145 
First, Texas argued that it needed to use filing fees to help 
keep down the number of people on the ballot, because having too 
many candidates can lead to voter confusion, clogging of the elec-
tion machinery, fractured votes, and other logistical problems.146 
 
Court avoids the “strict scrutiny” label. See, for example, M.L.B., 519 US at 115–16 (using 
the term “heightened scrutiny”). Ultimately, the exact standard is less important than the 
Court’s analysis and its results. 
 137 Central Florida, 774 F2d at 1524. 
 138 383 US 663 (1966). 
 139 Id at 664 & n 1. 
 140 Id at 666. 
 141 Id at 668, 670. 
 142 405 US 134 (1972). 
 143 Id at 135–36, 145, 149. 
 144 Id at 142–44. 
 145 Id at 147. 
 146 See Bullock, 405 US at 145. 
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Furthermore, the state asserted an interest in deterring “frivo-
lous or fraudulent candidates.”147 The rejection of these asserted 
interests as a justification for a wealth classification is important 
because limiting ballot size and defraying state costs parallel two 
of the main justifications a state might offer for public forum per-
mitting fees. 
Like ballot fees, public forum permitting fees carry signifi-
cant administrability benefits. The fewer the people who can pay 
the fee, the fewer problems there will be coordinating among dif-
ferent groups. Because one of the purposes of public forum regu-
lation is to coordinate among different speakers and balance the 
public’s interests in traffic control and clear streets,148 this pur-
pose might appear at first glance to be legitimate. However, no 
court has tried to justify public assembly fees in this way, and for 
good reason. The Bullock Court was very hostile to the “weeding 
out” justification, calling the fee requirement “extraordinarily ill-
fitted to that goal.”149 As the Court pointed out, serious candidates 
would be excluded by this scheme because of inability to pay, and 
nonserious candidates might be able to get on the ballot just by 
paying the fee.150 With a right so important at stake, the Court 
was unwilling to accept the state’s interest in lowering the num-
ber of prospective users as a justification for excluding some users 
based on wealth. One can imagine that such a justification would 
be similarly disfavored in the public forum arena, and, indeed, 
such an argument has been rejected by at least one appellate 
court.151 
The state might argue that its interest in limiting use of the 
public forum is different and more significant than its interest in 
limiting ballot size. Fees are likely an effective way of preventing 
frivolous or unpopular speakers from using expensive fora like 
 
 147 Id. 
 148 See notes 14–15 and accompanying text. 
 149 Bullock, 405 US at 146. 
 150 See id at 145–46. 
 151 See Eastern Connecticut Citizens Action Group v Powers, 723 F2d 1050, 1056 (2d 
Cir 1983). In Eastern Connecticut Citizens Action Group, the court rejected the govern-
ment’s attempt to justify an administrative fee for public demonstrations on the basis that 
it would “deter frivolous requests for the use of state property.” Id. The court reasoned that 
this justification had been “soundly rejected” in Bullock, which it characterized as holding 
“that the exercise of constitutional rights may not be conditioned upon financial require-
ments for the purpose of deterring frivolous requests.” Id. The court observed that the fee 
at issue in the case was “no more likely to deter frivolous than legitimate applicants,” 
especially when some people were “unable, not unwilling, to pay.” Id (emphases omitted). 
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the public streets. The government might argue that fees are es-
sential to prevent floods of poor speakers from constantly shut-
ting down the streets in order to convey their messages. What, 
after all, is to stop poor law students from asking Chicago if they 
may use Michigan Avenue to protest the use of the Bluebook in 
legal writing? However, while it might be true that frivolous use 
of the streets imposes more social costs than an overcrowded bal-
lot, Bullock’s logic still holds. As the Court pointed out in Bullock, 
wealth is a poor proxy for seriousness.152 If wealth is the only 
thing preventing this kind of abuse of the public forum, we would 
already expect to see frivolous-but-wealthy speakers using the 
streets to broadcast their ideas. 
Furthermore, the state has other tools that it could use to 
prevent overuse of the public forum by unpopular or nonserious 
speakers, and ones that do not so seriously implicate distribu-
tional concerns. The state may impose reasonable TPM re-
strictions on how public fora may be used, which might include 
requiring some kind of demonstration of interest (in the form of a 
petition or something similar) before allowing streets to be turned 
over for parades. There are, of course, reasons to be concerned by 
measures disfavoring unpopular speakers, but those reasons do 
not become less troubling when implemented by proxy. In fact, 
using wealth as a proxy for popularity is far more worrisome than 
implementing a direct popularity requirement. Even if wealth 
were a good proxy for popularity or support (which it probably is 
not), it raises serious concerns of economic equality and fairness 
that are not as present with a direct support requirement. 
This leaves the state’s interest in defraying the costs of con-
ducting primary elections, which has an even closer parallel in 
the realm of public forum access. Cost defrayment is the stated 
reason that these fees are permissible under Cox.153 The Court in 
Bullock admitted that there was a rational relationship between 
the ballot fees and the objective of relieving the state treasury, 
but held that the state had to show something more than a mere 
rational basis: “[U]nder the standard of review we consider appli-
cable to this case, there must be a showing of necessity.”154 The 
state did not meet the high standard required by the Court. 
 
 152 See Bullock, 405 US at 146. 
 153 Cox, 312 US at 577–78. 
 154 Bullock, 405 US at 147 (emphasis added). 
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Interestingly, the Court rejected an argument that because 
the candidates were “availing themselves of the primary machin-
ery, . . . they [should] pay that share of the cost that they have 
occasioned.”155 These costs, the Court said, “do not arise because 
the candidates decide to enter a primary or because the parties 
decide to conduct one,” but because the state has decided that pri-
maries ought to be held.156 Administrative costs and traffic control 
costs in the public forum are analogous, though the parallel is not 
exact. The costs of using a public forum do not arise because 
speakers decide to convey their message in public; they arise be-
cause the government has decided that it is in the best interests 
of all for the government to take on the role of coordinating among 
groups and policing their events. The government does not have 
to regulate the public forum as extensively as it does at present; 
in fact, in the past, the government took a much more passive role 
when it came to public assemblies, largely limiting its role to 
criminal policing to prevent rioting and other harm to society.157 
In both cases, it appears that the government has assumed a reg-
ulatory role in order to promote effective participation by coordi-
nating among different claimants on limited resources (voter at-
tention or public areas).158 Much like with political primaries, it is 
not obvious why the state should be able to pass on the costs of 
implementing these legislative judgments when they have the ef-
fect of making certain speakers unable to exercise a fundamental 
right.159 
Apart from the state interests asserted, the Bullock analysis 
has another interesting parallel to the public forum question. In 
Bullock, the Court emphasized that it was concerned about not 
only the equal protection rights of the candidates, but also the 
rights of less affluent voters. Because candidates were likely to 
rely on contributions from voters to pay these filing fees, the im-
pact of the fee would likely fall most heavily on members of the 
less affluent segment of the community, who might be less able to 
put their desired candidates on the ballot.160 Similarly, one might 
expect the impact of public forum fees to fall more heavily on the 
 
 155 Id at 147–48. 
 156 Id at 148. 
 157 El-Haj, 56 UCLA L Rev at 561–62 (cited in note 15). 
 158 See Lubin, 415 US at 712–13 (discussing government interests in regulating the 
primary ballot). See also notes 9–16 and accompanying text (discussing reasons for gov-
ernment regulation of the public forum). 
 159 See Bullock, 405 US at 147–49. 
 160 Id at 144.  
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less affluent, who might be less able to make financial contribu-
tions to groups and speakers they support. This parallel might 
not be helpful in the long run, however. In San Antonio Independ-
ent School District v Rodriguez,161 decided only a year after Bull-
ock, the Court demonstrated extreme reluctance to recognize as a 
wealth classification the disparate impact a funding system 
would have on a group of people who were likely to be poor.162 
Thus, the hypothetical impact of public forum fees on an unde-
fined class of possibly poor people would probably not be specific 
enough for a court to act on any perceived equal protection viola-
tion. Still, it is interesting to note that there are interests other 
than the speakers’ at stake here. Even if the impact on the gen-
eral public is not cognizable as an equal protection claim, fees 
might distort the public discourse in a way that tends to favor 
wealthy speakers and listeners.163 
Bullock dealt with very large fees (Texas charged some can-
didates as much as $8,900; the appellees in the case were charged 
$1,424.60, $6,300, and $1,000, respectively).164 The holding left 
open the possibility that reasonable filing fees might survive.165 
Two years later, however, in Lubin, the Court rejected this possibil-
ity. In Lubin, an indigent person who was unable to pay California’s 
ballot fee challenged the fee as an equal protection violation and 
an infringement on his rights of expression and association.166 As 
in Bullock, the Court recognized the state’s legitimate interest in 
deterring frivolous candidates and limiting ballot size.167 Again, 
however, the Court held that the fees were not sufficiently tai-
lored to promoting that interest when they indisputably disqual-
ified some serious but indigent aspirants to political office. “What-
ever may be the political mood at any given time, our tradition 
has been one of hospitality toward all candidates without regard 
 
 161 411 US 1 (1973). 
 162 See id at 18–20, 22–23. 
 163 Wealth distortions, of course, are likely to have disparate impacts on groups who 
are disproportionately poor. In Bullock, the appellees emphasized the possible disparate 
impact of the filing fee on black and Chicano people and on women, but the Court did not 
rely on these arguments. Compare Appellees’ Brief, Dies v Carter, No 70-128, *27–28 (US 
filed Aug 26, 1971) (available on Westlaw at 1971 WL 133723), with Bullock, 405 US at 
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 164 Bullock, 405 US at 135–36, 145. 
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 166 Lubin, 415 US at 710. 
 167 Id at 715. 
 2016] Must the Government Waive Public Forum User Fees? 2055 
 
to their economic status.” 168  However historically dubious the 
roots of this “tradition” might be, the Court’s message was clear: 
when the state imposes a wealth classification on the right to ap-
pear on the ballot and does not provide an alternative means of 
ballot access, the classification is unconstitutional.169 
Given the opinions in Bullock and Lubin, which are still good 
law,170 it is extremely likely that a wholesale denial of indigent 
access to a public forum would be a violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. Lubin and Bullock established that the Equal Protection 
Cause confers a “right to participate on an equal basis with other 
qualified voters whenever the State has adopted an electoral pro-
cess.”171 The right to assemble and share one’s views in public is 
important for many of the same reasons that voting and political 
candidacy are. All are central means by which citizens can partic-
ipate in civic life, exhort the government to change, and attempt 
to advocate for policy reforms and different political views. In fact, 
the close connection between electoral rights and First Amendment 
rights has been noted by courts and scholars.172 While the parallel 
is not exact, it would be difficult to argue that the right to speak 
and assemble in public is less important than the right to vote in 
a way that makes it more acceptable to deny access to indigents. 
If anything, the right to speak and assemble is more important, be-
cause it is so strongly related to self-fulfillment173 and the promotion 
 
 168 Id at 717–18. 
 169 See id at 718. 
 170 While subsequent cases have limited the reach of Lubin’s and Bullock’s reasoning 
with respect to voting rights, their holdings are still good law insofar as they address the 
issue of indigent ballot access. See Crawford v Marion County Election Board, 553 US 181, 
207 n * (2008) (Scalia concurring in the judgment). 
 171 Lubin, 415 US at 713, quoting Rodriguez, 411 US at 59 n 2 (Stewart concurring). 
 172 See, for example, Vieth, 541 US at 294 (Scalia) (plurality); Emily M. Calhoun, The 
First Amendment and Distributional Voting Rights Controversies, 52 Tenn L Rev 549, 
550–51 (1985) (arguing that the Court should develop a First Amendment analysis for 
voting rights controversies). 
 173 See David A.J. Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory 
of the First Amendment, 123 U Pa L Rev 45, 62 (1974) (“The value of free expression, in 
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of a healthy marketplace of ideas,174 in addition to its relationship 
to democratic participation.175 
Perhaps more importantly, however, this line of equal protec-
tion cases is not limited to the voting context: as the next Section 
shows, the Supreme Court has also found equal protection viola-
tions when wealth classifications block access to other fundamen-
tal rights. Thus, it is clear that this strain of equal protection ju-
risprudence is broader than just voting rights: the Court has held 
that indigents must be allowed access to rights that are consid-
ered “fundamental.” 
2. Equal protection and other fundamental rights. 
This Section examines the wider context of the electoral 
rights cases examined above to demonstrate that the Court tends 
to hold that fees must be waived for indigents in cases involving 
fundamental rights176 and government monopolies. While the Court 
has long held that wealth is not a protected class,177 in cases in 
which wealth restrictions implicate access to fundamental rights 
 
 174 See Abrams v United States, 250 US 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes dissenting): 
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may 
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wishes safely can be carried out. 
 175 See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L J 1131, 
1146–57 (1991) (arguing that the original purpose of the speech, press, petition, and as-
sembly clauses was to safeguard majoritarian democratic government). 
 176 It is not entirely clear why the rights that the Court designates as “fundamental” 
for purposes of this analysis are characterized as such. The Court has characterized laws 
impacting electoral participation (Bullock, 405 US at 142–43; Lubin, 415 US at 721–22), 
marriage (Boddie v Connecticut, 401 US 371, 376 (1971); Zablocki v Redhail, 434 US 374, 
390–91 (1978)), and criminal appeal (Griffin, 351 US at 18–19) as implicating fundamental 
rights, but has refused to treat other important rights as fundamental. See, for example, 
Dandridge v Williams, 397 US 471, 487 (1970) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to 
welfare restrictions); Lindsey v Normet, 405 US 56, 74 (1972) (rejecting a fundamental 
right to housing); Rodriguez, 411 US at 38 (rejecting a fundamental right to education). It 
is likely that the Court’s designation of fundamental rights reflects a practical desire to 
limit the reach of the Equal Protection Clause to require affirmative governmental assis-
tance. See Michael Klarman, An Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 Mich 
L Rev 213, 289–90 (1991). However, the definitional ambiguity of fundamental rights in 
this context should not impact the analysis of public forum user fees, because First Amendment 
rights must be fundamental under any reasonable definition. See Rodriguez, 411 US at 17 
(asking if “a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected by the Constitution” was 
at issue to determine if “strict judicial scrutiny” was required). 
 177 Rodriguez, 411 US at 28 (rejecting a claim that Texas’s school financing should be 
subject to strict scrutiny only because of its impact on poor students). 
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or interests on which the government holds a monopoly, the Court 
uses heightened scrutiny to invalidate fees restricting access to 
these rights. 
The Court has been forceful in requiring indigency waivers in 
the area of criminal justice. In Griffin v Illinois,178 the Court held 
that an Illinois statute requiring criminal appellants in noncapi-
tal cases to purchase their own trial transcripts in order to appeal 
violated due process and equal protection.179 The Court reasoned 
that “[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man 
gets depends on the amount of money he has,”180 and held that 
Illinois must therefore find some means of providing indigent de-
fendants with “adequate and effective appellate review.”181 While 
this might not mean requiring the state to purchase a transcript 
in every case in which the defendant cannot afford it, the state 
must provide some alternative way of allowing indigents fair ap-
pellate review.182 This was true even though there is no federal 
constitutional right to appellate review of trial court decisions.183 
As long as a state chooses to provide an appellate process, the 
Court held, it cannot allow some defendants to be excluded based 
on inability to pay a fee.184 In Mayer v City of Chicago,185 the Court 
clarified that Griffin applies even to nonfelony cases in which 
there is no chance of confinement.186 The state’s interest in pro-
tecting the public fisc was deemed “irrelevant” in light of the in-
vidious discrimination that exists “when criminal procedures are 
made available only to those who can pay.”187 
In the context of civil law as well, wealth classifications have 
been found to violate equal protection when they implicate funda-
mental interests. The civil law equal protection cases are partic-
ularly helpful because they show a strong adherence to the prin-
ciple that stricter scrutiny is required when both a fundamental 
interest and a wealth exclusion are present. For example, the 
 
 178 351 US 12 (1956). 
 179 Id at 18–20 (Black) (plurality). 
 180 Id at 19 (Black) (plurality). 
 181 Id at 20 (Black) (plurality). 
 182 Griffin, 351 US at 20 (Black) (plurality). 
 183 Id at 18 (Black) (plurality). 
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 185 404 US 189 (1971). 
 186 Id at 195–97. 
 187 Id at 197. 
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Court has found that indigent paternity defendants must be pro-
vided with blood tests at the state’s expense,188 that the state can-
not prohibit people from marrying because of their unpaid child 
support obligations,189 and that record preparation fees violated 
the defendant’s equal protection and due process rights when in-
ability to pay meant that the defendant was unable to appeal the 
termination of her parental rights. 190  On the other hand, the 
Court found no need for fee waivers for an applicant seeking a 
bankruptcy discharge because there was no “fundamental inter-
est” at stake.191 
However, the government does not subsidize the exercise of 
all or even most fundamental rights.192 For example, the govern-
ment is not required to subsidize the right to an abortion193 or the 
right to bear arms. However, the right to speak in a public forum 
is better analogized to rights like a fair trial or electoral partici-
pation, which the government must subsidize, because it simi-
larly involves a government monopoly. The rights the government 
is constitutionally required to subsidize generally involve situa-
tions in which the government controls all of the legitimate means 
of exercising the right. 
A helpful example is Boddie v Connecticut,194 in which the 
Court held that court fees violated due process when they denied 
indigent couples the ability to obtain a divorce.195 In Boddie, the 
Court distinguished divorce from other civil disputes because of 
the government monopoly involved. “[O]ur society has been so 
structured that resort to the courts is not usually the only avail-
able, legitimate means of resolving private disputes,”196 the Court 
wrote, whereas in the case of divorce “the judicial proceeding be-
comes the only effective means of resolving the dispute at hand 
 
 188 See Little v Streater, 452 US 1, 3, 16–17 (1981). 
 189 See Zablocki, 434 US at 390–91. 
 190 See M.L.B., 519 US at 107. 
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and denial of a defendant’s full access to that process raises grave 
problems for its legitimacy.”197 
Similarly, in Bullock, the Court emphasized the govern-
ment’s control over primary elections when rejecting an argument 
that primary candidates should share the costs of the primary 
machinery because they occasioned the costs. “[T]he costs do not 
arise because candidates decide to enter a primary or because the 
parties decide to conduct one, but because the State has, as a mat-
ter of legislative choice, directed that party primaries be held.”198 
The public forum is similar to the political primary: the state 
does not have to regulate access to the public forum,199 but has 
chosen to do so because it has decided that regulation will help to 
maintain order and promote the public convenience. By making 
itself the only avenue through which speakers can legitimately 
access the public forum, the government has placed public forum 
access in the same category as divorce, state-run primary elec-
tions, and criminal appeals. Forsyth County might suggest that 
the Court already implicitly recognizes this, because Forsyth 
County requires the government to subsidize police protection for 
controversial speakers in the public forum.200 Additionally, there 
is the basic point that the government by definition has a monop-
oly on the public forum, because the “quintessential” public fora—
streets, parks, and sidewalks—are government property.201 
Thus, it is clear that the Court applies close scrutiny to cases 
in which fees infringe on rights found to be fundamental in a va-
riety of contexts, not just when it comes to voting rights. There 
can be no real debate that the First Amendment rights to speak 
and assemble in a public forum are fundamental. The Bill of 
Rights is the template for the rights and interests considered 
“fundamental.”202 Additionally, the right to access a public forum 
is similar to other areas in which the government must subsidize 
access because it involves a government monopoly. 
 
 197 Id at 376. 
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It is true that First Amendment rights are substantively dif-
ferent from the fundamental interests the Court has recognized 
in cases like Bullock and Griffin. First Amendment rights are, by 
definition, explicitly protected by the text of the Constitution, 
whereas there is no independent federal constitutional right to 
vote or to appeal a conviction. There might therefore be some con-
ceptual strangeness to arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment 
can effectively change the scope of First Amendment protections. 
The Supreme Court, however, has indicated that the Fourteenth 
Amendment imposes constitutional limitations on speech that are 
at least coextensive with those imposed by the First Amendment,203 
and it would be even more conceptually strange to argue that the 
First Amendment limits the scope of the Fourteenth.204 It is there-
fore proper to analogize the fundamental rights protected by the 
First Amendment to the fundamental interests in Bullock and 
Griffin. 
It is clear that, following these cases, a wealth requirement 
that entirely prevented indigents from exercising the right to 
speak in a public forum would be subject to exacting scrutiny and 
almost certainly be found unconstitutional. The more difficult 
question is whether the same would be true when there are alter-
native fora that the speaker can access for free. 
C. Indigency Waiver with Ample Alternatives 
The common situation in public forum permitting ordinances 
involves imposing fees for use of the streets, but allowing speak-
ers to use sidewalks and parks without charge. As long as these 
alternatives exist, the majority of circuits have concluded, there 
is no violation of the indigent’s constitutional rights. The electoral 
process cases are distinguishable, according to the Sixth Circuit, 
because in those cases “failure to satisfy the fee prerequisite pre-
cluded the prospective participants’ involvement in the constitu-
tionally protected activity.”205 Additionally, the First Circuit re-
lied on Lubin’s language of “reasonable alternative means of 
ballot access” to differentiate it from the issue at hand.206 Thus, 
there are at least two related arguments for why the fundamental 
 
 203 See Mosley, 408 US at 94–96. See also Part IV.A. 
 204 Indeed, the Court has indicated in other contexts that the Equal Protection Clause 
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rights equal protection cases should not apply to a situation in 
which there are alternative fora that a speaker can use for free. 
If these arguments hold up, the ample alternatives fee scheme 
cases are distinguishable from Lubin and its relatives, and some 
fee schemes will be permitted. If, however, these distinctions are 
not satisfactory, Lubin should govern and the government should 
be required to waive fees for the indigent. The remainder of this 
Part examines the strength of the Sixth and First Circuits’ argu-
ments and ultimately concludes that they fail. 
1. Lubin’s “alternative means” language. 
One potential way to distinguish Lubin and related cases is 
by using Lubin’s own language. This argument is somewhat triv-
ial, but worth discussing because it hints at the broader level-of-
generality problem in the majority’s reasoning. The Court’s opin-
ion in Lubin implied that ballot access fees might be acceptable if 
the state provided an “alternative means” of access to the ballot.207 
Specifically, the Court suggested that candidates who could not 
pay could be required to demonstrate the seriousness of their can-
didacy by collecting a certain number of petition signatures.208 
The First Circuit seized on this language to argue that Lubin does 
not apply in cases in which there are alternative available fora.209 
This “alternative means” language was also adopted in the 
Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Central Florida. “The granting of a 
license permit on the basis of the ability . . . to pay . . . without 
providing for an alternative means of exercising First Amendment 
rights[ ] is unconstitutional.”210 This might be interpreted to im-
ply that the lack of an indigency waiver is constitutional so long 
as there are ample alternatives.211 In light of the citation to Lubin, 
however, such a reading would be misguided. In Lubin, the 
Court’s alternative means meant giving indigents a way to exer-
cise the same rights without having to pay a fee. The Eleventh 
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Circuit seems to have been imagining something similar in Central 
Florida, noting that the fee scheme in Lubin was a problem be-
cause it excluded potentially serious candidates without allowing 
them an alternative means of coming before the voters.212 
The reliance on Lubin’s alternative means language is there-
fore misguided. Nothing about the Lubin opinion suggests that it 
would be acceptable to put poor candidates on an alternative (and 
less desirable) ballot, which is analogous to the alternative fora 
argument. In fact, on the facts of Lubin, there is an analogous 
situation: the fee to run for the California State Assembly ($192) 
was much cheaper than the fee to run for the Los Angeles County 
Board of Supervisors ($701.60), which was the plaintiff’s desired 
position.213 Telling aggrieved indigent speakers to hold their pa-
rade on the sidewalks instead of on Main Street is analogous to 
the Court telling an indigent that even though he could not afford 
to run for County Board, his rights were not violated because he 
could afford to run for State Assembly. Instead of making an ar-
gument along these lines, the Court suggested other ways that 
the state could meet its stated goal of limiting ballot size while 
not excluding candidates from running from their chosen office 
because of inability to pay. 
This is not to say, of course, that selecting a political office is 
directly analogous to choosing a forum for speech. However, the 
Lubin analysis demonstrates that the “total” versus “partial” pre-
clusion point depends on how the right is defined, and shows the 
shortcomings of the majority position as a descriptive and concep-
tual matter. The alternative means language in Lubin does not 
imply that it is permissible to condition certain political rights on 
economic status so long as indigents can exercise some general 
right of political participation. Rather, it instructs that indigents 
must be granted some means of accessing the same ballot as every-
one else. If anything, Lubin’s language therefore provides support 
for the idea that the government must waive fees for indigent 
speakers. 
2. Total versus partial preclusion. 
The more important distinction offered by the majority of ap-
pellate courts is that the fundamental rights line of equal protec-
tion cases should not apply because these cases dealt with total 
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exclusions of indigents from a “constitutionally protected activ-
ity,” whereas in permitting fee cases indigents were precluded 
only from accessing specific fora, not from speaking or assembling 
in public fora altogether.214 
The strongest support for this argument comes from Rodriguez. 
In Rodriguez, parents challenged Texas’s local school funding 
scheme because it tended to deprive children in poorer districts of 
equal educational funding.215 The Court found it significant that 
the aggrieved group sustained only a “relative [ ] rather than [an] 
absolute” deprivation of the desired benefit (that is, education).216 
Distinguishing Griffin, Bullock, and other cases in which strict 
scrutiny had been applied to a wealth classification, the Court 
held that the lack of an absolute deprivation of the asserted right, 
along with “the absence of any evidence that the financing system 
discriminate[d] against any definable category of ‘poor’ people,” 
meant that the Texas system did not disadvantage any particular 
class.217 Rodriguez is an especially powerful precedent for the am-
ple alternatives argument because it holds that providing some 
students with a substantially poorer quality of education than 
others is not an equal protection problem.218 If access to the public 
forum is like education, it would not be a problem to deny access 
to the streets even if sidewalks and parks are a substantially 
worse choice for the speakers in question. 
Education is not like access to a public forum for purposes of 
equal protection analysis, however. The Rodriguez Court explic-
itly refused to hold that “education is a fundamental right, in the 
sense that it is among the rights and liberties protected by the 
Constitution.”219 Education, while important, does not receive the 
same constitutional solicitude as First Amendment rights. The 
fundamental line might be artificial, but the Court has been con-
sistent in using it to decide when waiver of fees is and is not 
required.220 
 
 214 Stonewall Union, 931 F2d at 1137. 
 215 Rodriguez, 411 US at 11–17. 
 216 Id at 19–21. 
 217 Id at 25, 28. 
 218 Id at 24–25. 
 219 Rodriguez, 411 US at 29. 
 220 Compare, for example, Kras, 409 US at 445 (finding no obligation to waive the 
court fee needed to secure bankruptcy discharge because “no fundamental interest [ ] is 
gained or lost depending on the availability of a discharge in bankruptcy”), and Ortwein v 
Schwab, 410 US 656, 659 (1973) (per curiam) (holding that appellants seeking a review of 
an agency determination reducing their welfare benefits were not entitled to a waiver of 
the appeal filing fee because “no fundamental interest [ ] is gained or lost depending on 
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To the extent that Rodriguez indicates that Bullock, Griffin, 
and their progeny apply only when there is absolute deprivation 
of a benefit, however, it is still a significant problem for any argu-
ment in favor of an indigency waiver. Few public forum fees will 
entirely preclude access to every possible public forum, and so 
most will not constitute an absolute deprivation of the right to 
speak in the public forum. The distinction drawn in Rodriguez 
between absolute and relative deprivation, however, seems to be 
a retrospective recharacterization of Griffin and related cases, 
and one that does not hold up well upon closer inspection. While 
it is true that most of the cases in the Griffin line deal with abso-
lute deprivation of a right, those cases themselves do not neces-
sarily suggest that an absolute deprivation is necessary to trigger 
strict scrutiny.221 
Furthermore, whether something is an absolute or relative 
deprivation depends entirely on how the right at issue is defined. 
The right in Griffin itself is a good example. At one level of gen-
erality, the right at issue can be defined as the right to appeal 
one’s conviction in a capital case. On this definition of the right, 
the defendant was absolutely deprived. However, at a broader 
level of generality, the right at issue was the right to have a fair 
trial, and the Court appears to have made a judgment that the 
right to seek review is a sufficiently important component of this 
due process right that depriving some people of review was fun-
damentally unfair. Defining the right broadly, the defendant did 
not experience a total deprivation of his due process rights, be-
cause presumably there was some level of fair process at the trial. 
Similarly, the issue in M.L.B. v S.L.J.222 was the right to ap-
peal termination of parental rights.223 However, the right at issue 
could be defined either more narrowly as the right to have the 
state subsidize the preparation fees for a trial record or more 
broadly as the right to make choices regarding one’s family life 
free from state interference without due process. In fact, the 
Court in M.L.B indicated that it is the importance of the parent-
child relationship which attracted strict scrutiny in the case, 
 
the availability of the relief sought”) (quotation marks omitted), with M.L.B., 519 US at 
127–28 (finding that fees that prevented impoverished parties from appealing parental 
status terminations were inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 221 See Rodriguez, 411 US at 119 (Marshall dissenting) (“Griffin . . . refute[s] the ma-
jority’s contention that we have in the past required an absolute deprivation before sub-
jecting wealth classifications to strict scrutiny.”). 
 222 519 US 102 (1996). 
 223 Id at 106–07. 
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demonstrating that it conceptualized the fundamental right 
broadly.224 One might say that M.L.B. nevertheless involved an 
absolute deprivation of that right, because in that case, without a 
chance to appeal the parent stood to lose her entire legal relation-
ship with the child. But in another sense, as in Griffin, the parent 
already had some due process protection for her parental rights 
at the trial level. Thus, what the court found offensive in M.L.B. 
was not that the parent was deprived of all due process regarding 
the termination of parental rights, but that poor parents were 
given less and worse process than wealthy parents. 
Even when it comes to something like voting rights, which 
appear at first glance to be rather binary—either you can vote or 
you cannot—the level-of-generality problem remains. There is no 
constitutional right to vote or to participate in a political primary, 
and the right at issue in Harper and Bullock could be defined 
broadly as a right to participate in politics or the electoral process. 
A citizen who cannot vote or run for office can still campaign for 
candidates, fundraise, and otherwise participate in politics. Even 
in the electoral context, therefore, it is difficult to say whether a 
given restriction completely prevents an indigent person from ex-
ercising her rights.225 
The same definitional problem exists regarding access to the 
public forum. If the right at issue is just a right to access a public 
forum, no matter how unsuitable for the speaker’s needs, then 
there has been no absolute deprivation and perhaps no equal pro-
tection violation. If, on the other hand, the right to speak and ex-
press oneself in a public forum encompasses a right to choose the 
forum one wants to use, subject to generally applicable nonfee re-
strictions, at least some speakers will be denied that right by their 
inability to pay the required fees. The majority of circuits seem to 
define the right at the more general level, and thus find that there 
is no equal protection problem because there has been no absolute 
deprivation of the right. 
However, it is not clear that this is the correct approach. The 
level-of-generality problem demonstrates that the distinction 
drawn by the Court based on absolute versus relative deprivation 
does not hold up well to closer examination, because many depri-
vations of rights could be framed as either relative or absolute 
depending on how the right is defined. Allowing cases to hinge on 
 
 224 See id at 116–20. 
 225 To be clear, the Court in Bullock and Lubin did not frame the issue this way. See 
Part IV.B.1. 
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this kind of definitional sleight of hand is not acceptable, at least 
without more careful discussion. While the level-of-generality 
problem is a fairly common one in constitutional law, especially 
when it comes to fundamental rights,226 it is still a problem in a 
legal culture that values logical consistency and nonarbitrary de-
cisionmaking. When a distinction rests so entirely on nonobvious 
definitional choices, it is open to arbitrariness and inconsistency. 
If similar cases are to come out differently, it should be because 
they are different in some normatively significant way. When the 
proffered difference is easily manipulable or arbitrary, it is diffi-
cult to say it is normatively significant. 
Even more importantly, however, choosing a level of generality 
necessarily involves a value judgment, 227  and by failing to 
acknowledge the level-of-generality problem presented by the total/ 
partial distinction, the majority is effectively hiding a contested 
value judgment. Even if the level-of-generality problem on its own 
is not fatal to the majority position, the majority should at least 
be able to demonstrate that its definitional choice rests on defen-
sible normative grounds, especially when its definitional maneu-
ver is being used to limit vital constitutional rights in a way that 
raises significant concerns about fairness. The next Section ar-
gues, however, that a narrower definition of the right is preferable 
from a normative perspective, taking into account the values and 
history underlying the First Amendment. 
3. Denial of the right to choose one’s forum is total 
preclusion. 
The right to speak and assemble in the public forum should 
be defined at a more specific level of generality as the right to 
choose one’s forum. This means that even assuming that some 
version of the total/partial preclusion distinction holds up, Lubin 
and related cases should still apply, because the right to speak in 
a public forum is more sensibly defined at a narrower level of gen-
erality than the majority of circuits have proposed. As discussed 
above, the total versus partial distinction does not stand up to 
close inspection, because it depends on definitional choices that 
are not self-evident. The total/partial preclusion point is valid be-
cause it points to the normative decisions the Court is making in 
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this area. It is not clear how the fundamental interests at issue 
should be characterized, so the Court must be making a norma-
tive definitional choice when it holds that an indigent person has 
been deprived of a fundamental right or interest. There is some 
point at which the presence of fees becomes so intrusive to an in-
digent’s exercise of her fundamental rights that it becomes con-
stitutionally unacceptable. The right can then be defined at that 
level for purposes of the total/partial distinction. 
The majority of circuits are already engaging in some defini-
tional choice. Most of the circuits define the right at issue as a 
right to access any public forum, regardless of what it is. However, 
the right could also be defined more broadly as the right to speak 
in public or convey one’s views to others. Speakers who are pre-
vented from accessing the streets, parks, and sidewalks do have 
alternatives. Instead of defining the right at issue as a broad right 
to convey one’s views to the public, therefore, the majority posi-
tion defines the right more narrowly as the right to access a public 
forum. This definition of the right is not self-evidently correct; it 
involves some kind of normative choice with a strong basis in con-
stitutional tradition.228 
In the context of the indigency inquiry, however, an even nar-
rower definition of the right—as a right to choose one’s forum 
(within traditional TPM limits),229 rather than a right to access 
any forum—is more sensible. The narrower definition makes 
more sense in light of the purposes of the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of the right to speak and associate in the public forum. 
This right is fundamentally about expression, and choice of place 
is a vital component of this kind of expression. Choice of place has 
important expressive content in itself, as many scholars have re-
cently recognized. 230  Professor Timothy Zick, for example, has 
 
 228 See, for example, Hague, 307 US at 515–16 (Roberts) (plurality) (discussing the 
“ancient” nature of the right to speak in the public forum). 
 229 These kinds of limits could be used to prevent an unlimited flood of speech at gov-
ernment expense by, for example, requiring some speakers to demonstrate a threshold 
interest in their speech. See Lubin, 415 US at 718–19. 
 230 See, for example, Timothy Zick, Space, Place, and Speech: The Expressive Topog-
raphy, 74 Geo Wash L Rev 439, 460 (2006) (“Speakers [ ] often fight for access to specific 
places because speech there is qualitatively and quantitatively different from speech else-
where.”) (emphases omitted); Thomas P. Crocker, Displacing Dissent: The Role of “Place” 
in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 75 Fordham L Rev 2587, 2588 (2007) (“Because where 
we speak is often just as important as what we say, increased efforts by the government 
to restrict the location of speech threaten to undermine the guarantees of the First 
Amendment.”) (emphases omitted). See also generally Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial 
 2068  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:2027 
   
noted the importance of “expressive place.”231 “Expressive places 
are repositories for memories. They often represent practices, his-
tories, conflicts, and accomplishments; they are condensations of 
values and they often convey meanings.”232 Location is not fungi-
ble when it comes to demonstrations in public. Restricting a 
speaker’s access to particular places therefore implicates a key 
expressive component of her speech. 
Understanding the vital significance of expressive space is 
crucial because it demonstrates the impact that user fees will 
have on indigent speakers. The problem is not simply that indi-
gent speakers will not be able to access certain specific fora, like 
the streets. While it is of course true that parading down Main 
Street says something different about the importance of your 
message than fighting your way down a crowded sidewalk, loca-
tion can matter in less obvious ways. In Eastern Connecticut Cit-
izens Action Group v Powers,233 for example, a nonprofit dedicated 
to promoting the revival of railway traffic in eastern Connecticut 
sought to protest a highway extension by organizing a “Railathon,” 
a thirteen-mile march along a stretch of abandoned railway bed.234 
The group believed that marching along the abandoned railway 
bed “would express the group’s opposition to the highway exten-
sion, and demonstrate the availability of a suitable corridor for a 
rail line.”235 Moreover, “[b]ecause the rail bed passe[d] under the 
interstate,” the group felt that the selected route would symboli-
cally “illustrate the choice between the two competing modes of 
transportation.”236 The group successfully challenged a fee that 
would have prevented them from using the railway bed.237 
While this example might be idiosyncratic, it demonstrates 
how central place can be to the expressive content of a demonstra-
tion, even beyond the considerations of convenience and visibility 
to a wide audience. If solvent, but not indigent, speakers can 
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choose their location, the indigent speakers will have substan-
tially poorer expressive capacity. Thus, the ability to choose one’s 
forum is arguably as central to the expressive function of the right 
of speech and association as the right to appeal the termination 
of one’s parental rights is to the rights of due process due to par-
ents, or as the right to appear on the primary ballot for a specific 
office is to the right of political participation. In this way, it is 
comparable to the right to have an appeal in a termination of 
parental rights case or the right to be on the ballot of a primary 
election. In each case, there is a broader right that would still ex-
ist without the narrower right, but in a much less meaningful way 
because the indigent individual has been deprived of an ex-
tremely important component of the broader right. 
Of course, it is true that many kinds of restrictions on speech 
will lessen the speaker’s expressive experience. Speakers who en-
joy using loudspeakers at night will be differentially impacted by 
prohibitions on using loudspeakers at night. However, re-
strictions that lessen the expressive possibilities for indigents are 
uniquely troubling. Fees that tend to give indigents a signifi-
cantly poorer expressive experience than solvent speakers are 
likely to systematically distort the public discourse in a way that 
laws differentially impacting nocturnal loudspeaker users do not.238 
The Court’s precedent in this area suggests that this kind of 
distortion is a relevant concern for this analysis. In Bullock, for 
example, the Court expressed great concern at the likely effect of 
the primary ballot fee on the public discourse. 239  The Bullock 
Court assumed that fees precluding indigent ballot access would 
tend to disadvantage the poor,240 but there might be other trou-
bling distortion effects from fees precluding indigent access. For 
example, given the complexities of collective action, fees might 
disfavor groups representing majority views when the benefits of 
expressing the viewpoint are too diffuse to motivate interested 
parties to donate.241 There is also the more obvious point that laws 
discriminating against the poor can be expected to uniquely disad-
vantage social groups who are more likely to be poor—especially 
racial minorities. However the distortion effect works in practice, 
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the fact that such effects exist is a cause for concern that differ-
entiates public forum user fees from other generally applicable 
restrictions on speech. A narrower definition of the right to access 
a public forum is therefore normatively desirable because it 
avoids the systematic distortions of the marketplace of ideas that 
result from allowing rich but not poor speakers to choose their 
forum.242 
In sum, a narrow definition of the right as a right to choose a 
forum makes more sense in light of the expressive core of the 
rights to speak and demonstrate in public, and in light of the im-
portance of preventing systematic distortion of the public dis-
course. And, if the right is defined narrowly in this way, indigent 
speakers are totally precluded from exercising it, which means 
that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a fee waiver for indi-
gent speakers. 
CONCLUSION 
The majority of circuit courts to date have analyzed the issue 
of indigency fee waivers under the First Amendment and con-
cluded that fee waivers are not required when indigent speakers 
are able to access alternative places from which to communicate 
their message. Analysis of the issue under the Equal Protection 
Clause, however, is a better conceptual fit because, unlike the 
First Amendment analysis, it addresses the fact that assessing 
fees is a government action that works to disadvantage specific 
groups of speakers. Unlike the First Amendment analysis, equal 
protection analysis leads to the conclusion that fee waivers ought 
to be required even when indigent speakers have access to alter-
native fora. 
 
 242 This is not to say that antidistortion is a state interest that may justify state action 
curtailing the exercise of certain speakers’ rights. See Citizens United v Federal Election 
Commission, 558 US 310, 348–52 (2010) (rejecting the suggestion that an antidistortion 
interest could justify limits on campaign contributions by corporations). It is merely a sug-
gestion that because preventing distortion of the marketplace of ideas is one of the norma-
tive values underlying the First Amendment, it ought to be considered when deciding 
when intrusions on speech become constitutionally intolerable. 
